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Abstract 
To examine how local income distribution affects both a community’s ability to 
pay for schooling and the quality of that schooling, this research merges household and 
school census data from South Africa.  Empirical results are twofold.  First, while the 
median income and the average household income increase school fees, inequality in 
household income (standard deviation) decreases school fees, which indicates that the 
lower tail of income distribution pulls down school fees.  Second, an increase in school 
fees significantly improves school quality, decreasing the learner-educator ratio and 
increasing the number of nonsubsidized educators.  The result is consistent with 
(1) strategic behavior of the low-income group and (2) optimal school fee determination 
with incomplete interhousehold income transfers.  Empirical results and simulations 
demonstrate the possibility that income and asset inequality may reduce the quality of 
public goods, decreasing human capital and income growth for the next generation. 
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1.  Introduction 
Aggregation of diverse opinions in public decisionmaking is crucial to the 
provision of public goods.  For example, the public provision of education influences the 
welfare of the majority since publicly financed school education equally benefits 
different income groups.  The way school is financed, however, is a particularly large 
concern for poor families whose human capital is an important determinant of their 
earnings.  
In this paper we examine the impact of unequal income distribution on the 
community’s capability to finance local schools in the empirical context of South Africa.  
In general, poor households, who face an imperfect credit market, find it difficult to 
finance their children’s schooling.  Where borrowing constraints exist, income and asset 
levels affect the ability to pay for child schooling.  As poor households can afford to pay 
less than rich households, this creates divergence in the ability to pay.  Thus, the 
inequality in income and asset distributions within a community can ultimately influence 
the quality of public goods.  How to compromise the conflicts between groups is a 
problem for local governance.
1 
Until recently, in South Africa, government subsidies have been limited, so 
financing of schools relies heavily on the collection of school fees—a user charge—from 
parents.
2  School governing bodies (SGBs), which consist of the principal, teachers, 
community leaders, parents, and in some secondary schools, learners, decide school fees.  
                                                 
1 A related problem arises from indivisibility in public good resource allocation.  If asset distribution is 
unequal, community members demand public investments that are complementary to the assets that they 
own.  For example, where land redistribution is difficult to implement, the landless may desire investment 
in child schooling, since public investment in land has no direct impact on their incomes.  Foster and 
Rosenzweig (2001) study this problem of public goods allocation between road and irrigation construction 
in the context of rural India. 
2 For accounts of the general situation in South African education, see Bot, Wilson, and Dove (2000), 
Crouch (1996), and Kriege et al. (1994). 2 
Therefore, the school fee represents the community’s ability to pay for education.
3  SGBs 
played a greater role in the period before a recently revised funding reform was 
implemented, whereby provincial governments allocate school subsidies progressively, 
according to local poverty measures. 
This example from South Africa has interesting features.  First, community 
members change the quality of local school education by changing the school fee.  The 
quality of education, and therefore that of human capital is endogenous under community 
governance.
4 
Recent literature examines the resource allocation problem in local public goods 
in developing countries.  Foster and Rosenzweig (2001) study the effects of village-level 
choices on public investment in roads or irrigation in India.  In their empirical context, 
there are two different groups in a rural economy: the landless and the landed.  The 
landless prefer road investment, which opens access to employment (thus increasing 
returns to labor), while the landed favor irrigation investment, which increases returns to 
land.  Strengthening democracy shifts local public resources from irrigation to road 
construction, as the landless (majority) become more vocal.  Recent literature also 
includes Ghatak and Ghatak (2002) and Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004), which study 
the impact of women’s participation in policy decisionmaking in India.  While these 
examples highlight the resource allocation problem in the context of local public 
decisionmaking, user cost and the quality of public goods are not examined. 
                                                 
3 Not only education but some local public management in agriculture requires collective decisions at the 
community level.  For example, public investment in and maintenance costs of irrigation are shared in the 
community, which affects agricultural productivity in the future.  We imagine that forest management has 
similar features.  However, the latter faces the asymmetric information problem and therefore a free rider 
problem. 
4 Strengthening local democracy may create greater inequality in education quality across communities 
without effective government subsidy.  The government may raise the quality of education by allocating 
(conditional) credit to poor households.  Whether the targeting should be at the household level (within the 
community) or at the community level depends on the sensitivity of the school fee to changes in the 
average income and in inequality within the community.  This question is answered quantitatively in 
Section 6, based on our parameter estimates. 3 
Second, the quality of education has a long-term implication.  It determines 
human capital for the next generation and therefore their income opportunities in the 
future.  Income growth ultimately affects consumption growth, which improves 
nutritional intake.
5  Therefore, an improvement in educational quality, particularly 
through mother’s education, provides a supply-side foundation for consumption and 
nutrition growth.  It can also change political participation, particularly for women in the 
country. 
In the above context, we are interested in the relationship between local inequality 
and the quality of human capital investment and therefore growth.  Since Lewis (1954) 
and Kaldor (1956), economists have tried to determine whether and how inequality 
affects growth at the national level.  More recently, Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Person 
and Tabellini (1994), and Perotti (1993) have proposed mechanisms that in an unequal 
society result in distributional conflicts in policies that hinder the incentive to invest, 
therefore leading to lower growth.
6 7  Galor and Zeira (1993) assess the negative effects 
of inequality on growth in the presence of an imperfect credit market and indivisible 
human capital. 
Although our paper is not concerned with aggregate growth, we share some 
elements with them.  First, political process is important in resolving the variations in 
ability to pay for education among community members.  Second, heterogeneity arises in 
the presence of an imperfect credit market and thus a liquidity constraint among the poor 
in the community.  As these political economy models predict, this implies that inequality 
                                                 
5 In the long run, income growth improves nutritional and health outcomes over generations, by securing 
sufficient consumption growth and further reinforcing schooling investments and outcomes.  Yamauchi 
(2005a) attempts to identify the effects of early childhood nutrition and health status on schooling 
investments and outcomes in South Africa. 
6 Easterly (2002) analyzes growth effects of inequality with focus on changes in institutional quality, 
redistributive policies, and schooling. 
7 As Glomm (2004) shows, if redistribution from the rich to the poor takes the form of public investment in 
education benefiting the poor, the initial inequality that increases the political pressure on redistribution 
through public education can increase the aggregate growth. 4 
results in lower growth due to the inherent difficulty in reaching a growth-promoting 
decision.
8 
The second section of this paper lays out a simple model, characterizing 
implications of the linkage of income distribution and school fees, while Appendix 1 
presents an equally explanatory model.  Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy, with a 
focus on possible endogenous sorting in school choice and household mobility in the 
light of the recent reform in the education funding allocation in South Africa. 
Section 4 describes the data that we use in the empirical analysis, which are 
merged from several sources.  The first data set consists of the Census 2001 Community 
Profile database and School Census 2002, which together provide the information on 
school fee and community characteristics in 2001.  The second set is constructed from a 
clustered household survey: KwaZulu Natal Income Dynamics Study 1998 and School 
Census 1999, which jointly identify school fee and community factors in the province of 
KwaZulu Natal in 1998.  In addition, the School Census 1999 can provide the details of 
school financing conditions and school governing body activities.  We also assess the 
impacts of school finance on school quality with panel data from 1996 and 2000. 
Section 5 summarizes our empirical results.  Our analysis of school fee 
determination shows that (1) the school fee increases as the median (or average) 
household income increases, but (2) it decreases as income distribution becomes more 
unequal (measured by the standard deviation).  Thus, the richer a community is, the more 
likely they can afford to support higher school quality.  However, low-income people in a 
community pull down the quality of school education.  The analysis of school quality 
determination shows that both school fees and a government subsidy per learner can 
improve school quality, decreasing the learner-educator ratio.  In particular, the size of 
school fee revenue has a significant effect on the number of nonsubsidized educators. 
                                                 
8 These authors also provide evidence from country level data. For an example of cross-village studies, see 
Benjamin, Brandt, and Giles (2004), which shows that higher inequality at the village level impeded 
growth in China. 5 
In Section 6, simulations are conducted to quantify the impact of changes in intra-
community income distribution on school fees and thus the community’s ability to invest 
in schooling, which demonstrates that a reduction in inequality leads to a substantial 
change in school fees.  Therefore, we may increase the quality of education by 
redistributing income within a community, while maintaining the mean in each 
community, thus maintaining the aggregate income constant in the country.  Implications 
of these findings are discussed in the final section. 
2.  A Basic Model 
Environment 
Here we set up a simple model that captures key empirical observations from 
South Africa to prove that income inequality is associated with a lower school fee and 
thus lower quality of education.  Suppose there are N households in the community.  In 
period 1, parents finance investments in children’s schooling according to their 
exogenous income.  Let yi denote the exogenous income and p the school fee.  In period 
2, children work and contribute to household income.  Let q(p) denote the quality of 
education that determines their future earnings.  Assume that q′ > 0 and q″ < 0.  Parents 
maximize the discounted sum of utilities from the current and future consumptions:  
u(yi – p) + βv[q(p)], where u and v are utilities in the current and future periods, 
respectively, both strictly increasing and concave, and β ∈(0,1) is the discount factor. 
Without a credit market, the first order condition is 
  1,2 [* () ] (,) ii
q









ii cyp = −  
and 6 
 
2 () i cq p = . 
There exists a unique optimal school fee 
*, i p  given yi.   
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9  This condition holds, for example, if q(p), where 
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rider incentive exists.  However, in this paper, we do not examine this type of game.  
With the condition (1), each household has its optimal school fee, 
*. i p   The 
nondegenerate initial income distribution leads to the distribution of the optimal 
willingness to pay:  
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Since the rank order of 
*
i p  follows that of income in our setting, the voting equilibrium 
** p  is only sensitive to the median of income in the community. Therefore, income 
inequality does not matter as long as the median is constant.
10 


































10 The political economy growth model asserts that the dependence of the redistribution policy (for 
example, capital income tax for transfer to the poor) on median income and/or wealth implies the negative 
growth effect of inequality.  Only under the condition that an increase in inequality decreases the median 
does this proposition hold.  In empirical analysis below, we control the median or mean income to 
investigate the effect of the standard deviation (a proxy for inequality) on endogenous school fees. 7 
If the credit market is perfect, the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution is 
uniquely equalized to the market interest rate, 1 + r, so the optimal p becomes unique no 










In this case, therefore, there would be no potential conflict in setting the school fee in a 
community.
11  Income inequality does not matter. 
Proposition 1 
 
(1) In majority voting without a perfect credit market, the school fee is equal to the median of individual-
specific optimal school fees of the community members. 
(2) With a perfect credit market, community decisionmaking disappears and the unique school fee is 
determined by individual decisionmaking. 
 
Strategic Behavior in a Community 
We consider the possibility that a school fee may not be paid by poor households.  
This model interprets the empirical regularities found in South Africa.  Suppose that the 
school governing body that sets the school fee consists of community members from the 
high-income group.  This represents a so-called elite capture (see, for example, Bardhan 
and Mookherjee 2000), but we also incorporate strategic responses from the poor.  That 
is, the low-income group, observing the announced school fee, can choose whether or not 
to pay it.  For simplicity, assume that there are two income groups, yH (high) and yL 
(low), where yH > yL. 
                                                 












=− < < .  Since the first order condition does not contain the initial condition, the Nash 
equilibrium is symmetric. 8 
Actions are sequential.  In the first stage, the high-income group (leader) sets p.  
In the second stage, the low-income group decides the actual payment p - τ, affecting the 
quality of education for both groups.  In reality, those who cannot pay the school fee can 
apply for formal exemptions, and even if the exemptions are not granted, they can usually 
substitute by providing some services to schools, such as cleaning playgrounds and 
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for high and low income groups respectively, where the quality of education is q(p,τ), 
with q1 < 0 and q2 < 0.  We assume that τ is continuous, and for simplicity, that there is 
only one school within a community. 
Payment postponement, expressed by τ here, causes the quality of education to 
deteriorate, which affects children’s future income for both groups.  This could be a 
credible threat to the high-income group, since they have already committed to payment 
(or have paid), and the action taken by the low-income group also affects the payoff for 
the high-income group.
12  This is possible because the marginal cost of the school fee 
payment is higher for the low-income group as their income level is lower (that is, 
marginal utility is higher). 
The problem is solved in backward induction.  If τ  ∈[0,p] is continuous, the first-
order condition with respect to τ for the low-income group is 
  ( )
''
2 ,0 LL uq v F p βτ + ≡= , 
under the assumption that | q2 | is large enough to guarantee an interior solution.  This 
condition holds, for example, when the number of low-income community members is 
                                                 
12 In reality, those who cannot afford to pay school fees or need to substantially delay the payment can be 
exempted in full or part by providing some labor services to schools such as cleaning school facilities. 9 
large.  The first-order condition defines the response function τ(p).  An increase in p 
increases τ
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Therefore, if the high-income group sets a high school fee, the low-income group is likely 
to pay less.  Taking this condition into account, the maximization problem on p for the 
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  Assume that the second order condition holds.
13  In this Subgame 
Perfect Nash Equilibrium, therefore, the equilibrium p
** is smaller than that without τ.
14  
We also obtain a similar result from this noncooperative game setting. 
 
                                                 
13 In other words, 
"2 "' 0.










14 To learn about Nash and Subgame Perfect Nash equilibriums, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1993), for 
example, which is one of the basic textbooks on game theory. 10 
Proposition 2 
As the income level for the low-income group decreases, p
** also decreases if 
"'




Proof: In this simple model, the effect of an increase in income level among the low-income group on the 
























































 (the second-order condition for p), we 
obtain the result that if 
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Note that this result incorporates the strategic nonpayment threat from the low-income group, which is 
demonstrated. 
 
We summarize the theoretical predictions on the effect of income distribution 
within a community on the equilibrium school fees in different models that we have 
examined as follows.  The characteristics of income distribution that we focus on are the 
median, average, and standard deviation of household income in a community. 
First, voting theory predicts a positive effect of the median community income on 
the school fee.  This implication also survives in a noncooperative game.  Second, a 
noncooperative dynamic game with a credible nonpayment threat by the low-income 
group predicts that income variations decrease the school fee.  Simply, the low-income 
households put pressure on the school fee by implying the possibility of nonpayment. 11 
As discussed in Appendix 1, this is not the only explanation for the negative 
correlation between income inequality and the school fee.  The social planner’s 
programming with complete income redistribution (that is, exemption policies) predicts 
that the average community income increases the school fee.  With incomplete 
interhousehold transfers, income inequality also implies a decrease in the optimal school 
fee. 
3.  Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we discuss the empirical framework to test the key implications of 
community effects on school fee determination.  To capture the effect of community-
level income distribution on the school fee, we focus on the mean or median and the 
standard deviation to represent the average income level and the variations respectively.
15  
Specifically, we estimate 
  ( ) ( ) 12 ln ,
pp
jt k k jk k d jt pm y s d y z α ββ δ μ ε ∈ =+ + + + +   (3) 
where pjt is the school fee charged in school j located in community k at year t, m(yk) is 
the median or mean of household income yk in the community, sd(yk) is the standard 
deviation, zjk is a vector of community and school characteristics, 
p
kd μ ∈  is the area fixed 
effect that captures community or area-specific fixed unobservables, and εjt is an error 
term.  Since the distribution of pjt is highly skewed, it is log transformed. 
In equation (3), we predict that β1 > 0 and β2 < 0 in both the case of the social 
planner’s problem with incomplete income transfers and in the case of a noncooperative 
dynamic game with a credible threat by the low-income group.  It is important to control 
the average level of community income (that is, the poverty level), as we have to examine 
the impacts of a mean-preserving spread of income distribution within the community. 
                                                 
15 In the future, it will be necessary to check the robustness of our findings on the income inequality effects, 
with Gini coefficients, 90/10, and 75/25 ratios.  It is known that standard deviation is sensitive to extremely 
large values (outliers). 12 
An identification problem arises if unobserved heterogeneity in the school fee is 
correlated with income distribution in the community.  First, it is important to remember 
that schools do not change locations in general.  Unless the government rebuilds or 
integrates schools, they stay in the same place.  Therefore, in contrast to individual 
earning equations, we assume that school relocation will lead to correlations between 
unobserved components and the community income distribution. 
Second, however, it is quite plausible that households may move from one place 
to another looking for better educational opportunities or choose to send their children to 
school in other communities.  In these cases, the nature of endogenous income 
distribution depends on who moves. 
In the case of household movement, it is natural to conjecture that parents who 
desire to increase their access to better schools may move into well-off communities or 
neighborhoods.  Where relatively poor households move to new schools, a greater 
unexplained component in school fee variations correlates with lower incomes.  This type 
of household mobility lowers the average income and increases income inequality within 
a community.  A good example is household movement from rural to urban areas, which 
is prevalent in South Africa today.  However, this endogeneity leads to an upward bias in 
the effect of income inequality on the school fee, and therefore the negative effect of 
income inequality is robust to this type of endogenous household mobility.  Similarly, the 
direction of bias in the effect on average income would be downward since the inflow of 
households decreases the mean income in the community.  A positive effect of the 
average income would be a lower bound. 
In South Africa, high-quality schools that charge relatively high school fees are 
located in well-off communities as a result of the apartheid segregation policy before 
1994 (see Yamauchi 2004 for some evidence on geographical clustering).
16  This 
                                                 
16 Casual observation also tells us that rich households, for example, whites, stay in their well-off 
residential areas, while relatively poor households move into the communities or neighborhoods from rural 
areas or historically disadvantaged residential areas (townships).  Some exceptions are centers of large 
cities such as Johannesburg where the center has relocated to the new suburbs. 13 
historical initial condition limits the possibility that rich households move to well-off 
communities to access high-quality schools. 
The possibility of commuting to schools outside the community creates a different 
type of endogeneity problem.  In contrast to household movements, this does not change 
income distribution.  Therefore, as long as we restrict our focus in the estimation of 
equation (3), we do not face bias in parameter estimates.  However, a problem arises in 
our interpretation of the parameter estimates of interest. 
For example, relatively rich households in the community can send their children 
to private schools outside the community, while children from the relatively poorer 
households in the community attend local public schools.
17  In this case, since we control 
the average income level, it is easy to obtain the negative effect of income inequality on 
the school fee.  In our setting, we have no means to control this effect, as it is impossible 
to identify the households who send their children outside the community or to determine 
where the children are sent. 
From the viewpoint of the hosting community, this means that children from 
relatively poor households outside the community attend local schools, which implies 
that the school fee is likely to be decreased as a result of this pressure.  In this case, 
changes in the school fee attributed to such pressure can be treated as shocks in our 
empirical framework.  However, this shock component is negatively correlated with the 
average income, since higher community income levels coupled with high-quality 
schools attract children from relatively poor households outside the community.  A 
positive effect of the average income, as we hypothesized, is robust to this bias. 
We do not know the magnitude of the potential bias, which depends on how likely 
it is that short-run school fee shocks or unobservable fixed factors will induce household 
mobility and child commuting.  In the analysis that covers the whole country of South 
Africa, we control for subplace characteristics such as the unemployment rate, population 
density, proportions of black and white populations, and settlement type distributions, in 
                                                 
17 This situation is possible in the post-apartheid regime, as those who gain economic opportunities among 
the historically disadvantaged group can send their children to schools formerly restricted to whites. 14 
addition to mean and standard deviations of the subplace income distribution.  Since 
household mobility is important in urban areas, these factors can mitigate the effects of 
endogenous sorting.  In the analysis of KwaZulu Natal, however, since the sample 
clusters are mostly from rural areas, this problem is less serious.  The endogeneity of 
income distribution is not a serious problem.
18 
To check robustness of the key prediction, we use as a dependent variable not 
only school fees but also total revenue per learner, donations per learner, and funds raised 
per learner with the same specifications used in the school fee equation, using a 
provincial data set that covers 67 clusters.  While school fees are collected from 
households, the other revenue measures do not necessarily accrue to households but 
reflect other revenue opportunities for schools.  Evidence from these indicators will 
supplement the main analysis of school fee determination. 
In the analysis of KwaZulu Natal, we assess school quality function, by 
estimating the following school production functions: 
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 (4b) 
where Δ is the difference operator, Yjk is the number of educators , Ljk is the number of 
learners, yik is the learner-educator ratio, and gjkt is the per-learner subsidy from the 
government. 
As discussed below, the learner-educator ratio is a measure of school quality.  
However, we also admit that this measure can only partially capture overall school 
quality, which is supplemented by other measures such as teaching facilities (classroom 
conditions, such as the availability of desks and blackboard), quality of school 
                                                 
18 The government changed the boundary definition for subplace, a geographical unit that we use in the 
analysis, between the Census of 1996 and the Census of 2001.  Therefore, panel analysis is infeasible. 15 
administration, and so forth.  We constructed the learner-educator ratio from two school 
censuses in 1996 and 2000, which focus on school facilities.
19  Since the government 
subsidy allocation in principle did not change before 2000, we assume that the subsidy 
reported for 2000 basically applies to the period before 2000.  Here zjk includes former 
department indicators. 
We also test whether a change in the number of learners induces change in the 
number of educators who are privately employed in the community.  To supplement the 
limited number of subsidized educators, community members can collect school fees and 
employ educators privately. 
In equation (4), if the government subsidizes disadvantaged schools more (that is, 
the schools that have fewer educators relative to the number of learners), potential bias in 
γ2 would be upward since differences ξjt are positively correlated with the per-learner 
subsidy gjkt.  On the other hand, if the government subsidy allocation increases inequality 
in the number of educators, we would expect a downward bias in the estimate.  However, 
since fixed unobservables are already differenced out, the systematic component of 
endogenous subsidy allocation has no impact on our estimates.  
Finally, how the subsidy per learner is determined is also of interest to us in the 
empirical analysis.  Though one possible way to eliminate the bias mentioned above is to 
use instruments for gjkt, we lack identifying instruments in the available data.  Therefore, 
we simply examine the effects of the school fee, the initial learner-educator ratio, former 
departments, and the fixed effects of school type and location. 
4.  Data 
The data for this research come from several sources in South Africa.  In the first 
set of analyses, which covers South Africa as a whole, the Census 2001 community 
                                                 
19 Since measurement errors are reported in the number of learners in Annual School Surveys, we decided 
to use the 1996 and 2000 School Registers of Needs.  The latter has a simplified questionnaire structure 
focusing on school facility information.  Therefore, they are likely to have fewer measurement errors. 16 
profile database from Statistics South Africa (Stats SA) provides the distribution of 
socioeconomic characteristics such as household income and population group 
compositions.  The Annual School Survey 2002 from the National Department of 
Education (DOE) provides the data on school fees charged in 2001.  By merging these 
data, therefore, we can determine the school fee in 2001 for the country as a whole.
20  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of public school fees.  It is interesting to note that the 
distribution is bimodal.  Figure 2 shows the distribution by the former apartheid-
government departments.  Formerly non-African schools, including Whites, Coloured, 
and Indian, have higher school fees than formerly African schools, suggesting that we 
have to control for the effects of former departments.  This also implies that, given the 
current residential clustering, community characteristics are correlated with school fees. 
Figure 1—Distribution of the log of annual school fees, South Africa 
                                                 
20 School Census 2002 does not provide the details of school financial conditions used in this analysis, 
however. 
  
Figure 2—Log of annual school fees, by former apartheid-government departments 
Notes:  BOP:  African—Bophuthatswana Education Department; CISKEI:  African—Ciskei Education Department; DET: African—Department of Education and Training; GZK:  
African—Gazankulu Department of Education; HOA: White—Department of Education and Culture: House of Assembly; HOD:  Indian—Department of Education and Culture: House of 
Delegates; HOR:  Coloured—Department of Education and Culture: House of Representatives; KaNGWANE:  African—KaNgwane Department of Education; KND:  African—
KwaNdebele Department of Education; KZ:  African—KwaZulu Department of Education and Culture; LEB:  African—Lebowa Department of Education; NEW EDUC DEPT:  all races—
Schools established after 1994, New Education Department; QWAQWA:  African—QwaQwa Department of Education; TED:  White—Transvaal Education Department; TRANSKEI:  





In this analysis, subplace in the South African Census 2001 is used as the 
geographical unit.  GIS information enables us to identify schools in each subplace (Stats 
SA, GIS).  We restrict the analysis to subplaces with a population density of more than 10 
persons per square kilometer and area smaller than 500 square kilometers to exclude 
nonresidential and farm areas. 
In the second set of analyses, we use school and community information from the 
province of KwaZulu Natal.  School information comes from the Annual School Survey 
1999 (DOE) and the KwaZulu Natal Department of Education’s Norms and Standards 
database (KZN DOE), while community information comes from the 1998 KwaZulu 
Natal Income Dynamics Study [KIDS-2, by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI)], which covers a random sample of households in 67 clusters in the 
province of KwaZulu Natal.
21  One advantage of this particular combination is that we 
have details of school financial conditions from the Annual School Survey 1999.  
However, since nation-wide household surveys that can be matched with school 
information by GIS were not conducted in 1998, we cannot cover the country as a whole.  
The 1999 school survey also collects information on the functioning of the schools’ 
governing bodies, including frequency of meetings, composition, and agenda discussed in 
1998.  We identify schools within and near the clusters based on school lists provided in 
the KIDS-2 community survey.  These schools do not necessarily pertain to schools 
inside the communities; nearby schools to which children could possibly commute are 
included. 
To supplement the second set of analyses, information on school fees in 1999 to 
2000 was also obtained from the KZN DOE.  In the province of KwaZulu Natal, 
                                                 
21 These household data pertain only to the province of KwaZulu Natal.  The KwaZulu Natal Income 
Dynamics Study 1998 (KIDS-2) is based on the SALDRU 1993 data set, which probabilistically covered 
the whole of South Africa in 1993.  The follow-up survey, which was conducted in 1998, covered only 
KwaZulu Natal.  We use data from the 1998 survey to construct community characteristics.  The 1993 
survey was population weighted representative of the province, based on the 1991 census.  In the 1998 
follow-up survey, some clusters were dropped either because the rejection rate from the white population 
was quite high, or because interviews were unsafe in some locations.  The 1998 household survey provides 
detailed information on household activities. 19 
therefore, we can track dynamic changes in the school fee to check robustness of the 
main findings. 
To assess school quality, we use different data sets.  The School Register of 
Needs 1996 and 2000 obtained from the KZN DOE focus on school facility information, 
so that they are suitable to compute changes in learner-educator ratios and the number of 
educators from 1996 to 2000.  In this analysis, we use information on school fees and 
government funding as key explanatory factors.  Since the latter data are only available 
for the province of KwaZulu Natal, we restrict our analysis to that province. 
Data on government subsidies are also received from the KZN DOE Norms and 
Standards database.  Currently a funding reform is under way in the South African public 
education system, which attempts to allocate more funding to poor schools and 
communities on the basis of a poverty ranking of schools and areas in each province.  We 
use the information on actual funding during the period of January to March 2000—
before the implementation of the funding reform—so that we can assume that it 
represents the status quo in the period before 2000. 
5.  Empirical Results 
School Fee and Community Income Distribution 
This section summarizes estimation results.  We first present the results for the 
whole country of South Africa, based on the information on school fees and subplace-
level characteristics in 2001.  Table 1 reports the effects of the subplace-level income 
distribution on the log of the annual school fee. Column 1 includes mean and standard 
deviations of household income in addition to school type and district fixed effects.  The 
Census 2001 community profile database only produces the number of households (or 
individuals) in each income range, so a median estimate from the data would have 
excessively small variations across subplaces.  For this reason, we use mean income in 
Table 1.  The sample used in the estimation consists of subplaces that have population 
densities larger than 10 persons per squared kilometer and areas of smaller than 500 20 
square kilometers.  In this benchmark specification, the mean and standard deviations 
have positive and negative effects, respectively, on the school fee, consistent with the 
predictions in Section 2. 
Table 1—Effects of income distribution on school fees, South Africa 2001 
Dependent: Log of annual school fee 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Mean  household  income  0.00002  0.00001  7.55E-06 5.02E-06 4.95E-06 4.88E-06 
  (21.29)  (12.60)  (9.19) (6.32) (5.88) (6.06) 
Standard  household  income  -2.63E-06 -1.24E-06 -7.84E-07 -4.32E-07 -4.66E-07 -4.01E-07 
  (11.03)  (6.82) (4.47) (2.57) (2.55) (2.34) 
Unemployment  rate      -0.4263 -0.2939 -0.3990 -0.3223 
      (9.50) (7.54) (8.57) (8.21) 
Population  density      -0.00002  -5.18E-06 -7.25E-06 -5.67E-06 
      (3.06) (1.08) (1.40) (1.15) 
Proportion  African        -0.5023 -0.6102 -0.5540 
        (5.88) (6.31) (6.16) 
Proportion  Whites        0.4936 0.5703 0.5344 
        (4.24) (4.44) (4.47) 
Settlement  type  %      Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Former department fixed 
effects    Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
School type fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Persons per square kilometer  >10 >10 >10 >10  >100  >10 
Area  (square  kilometer)  <500 <500 <500 <500 <500  <50 
R-squared  0.6153 0.7138 0.7249 0.7300 0.7472 0.7392 
Number of observations  14,204  14,204 14,174 14,174 12,059 13,464 
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are absolute t values, using robust standard errors with subplace clusters.  
Settlement type percentages include those of urban, informal, industrial, institutional, and hostel, 
leaving others as omitted. 
 
In Column 2, the indicators of former education departments are included to 
control the historically persistent tendency in school fee gaps across different population 
groups.  The main results of the income distribution effects remain robust to these 
controls. 
Columns 3 and 4 include other socioeconomic factors specific to subplace.  In 
Column 3, the unemployment rate, population density, and the percentages of different 21 
settlement types (urban, informal, industrial, institutional, and hostel) are included.  
While an increase in either the unemployment rate or population density or both 
decreases the school fee, the parameter estimates of our interest remain significant and 
consistent with our predictions.  In addition, Column 4 includes the proportion of the 
African and white populations that control the effects of population compositions.  An 
increase in the white population increases the school fee, while an increase in the African 
population decreases the fee.  Again, the key results are significant in all specifications. 
As mentioned, we restrict our sample to the subplaces with population density 
larger than 10 persons per square kilometer and areas smaller than 500 square kilometers.  
In preliminary analyses, different criteria were also tested to investigate the robustness of 
the main results.  In Columns 5 and 6, which use alternative criteria, we also obtain quite 
similar parameter estimates, which implies that our results are not derived spuriously 
from the inclusion of too sparsely populated nonresidential areas. 
Table 2 reports results on school fee determination, based on the merged 
community and school sample from the province of KwaZulu Natal.  Factors of interest 
are community income distribution characteristics: median and standard deviation.
22  In 
order to check robustness, the logs of annual school fees are taken from 1998 to 2000.  
To control unobserved heterogeneity specific to locations, we use educational circuit 
fixed effects.  A circuit is a smaller administrative unit than a magisterial district at the 
provincial department level. School types (primary, secondary, and combined) and 
location fixed effects are included to control school-type specific unobserved factors that 
differ across circuits.  In the estimation, observations with extremely large values of 
school fees and community-income standard deviations are excluded from the sample.
23 
                                                 
22 In preliminary analysis, we also confirmed that basic results remain robust with mean income, rather than 
median income.  However, median income provides slightly higher t-values and better overall fit than mean 
income does. 
23 The sample also pertains only to schools under KwaZulu Natal government ownership.  In some 
exceptional cases, this includes private schools. 22 
Table 2—School fees and revenue, KwaZulu Natal Province 
  Log annual school fee 




















Dependent variable  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Monthly household income 1998                 
  Median  0.00017  0.00017  0.00015  0.0131  -3.26E-06  0.0036  -0.0002  0.0002 
  (4.84)  (6.53)  (8.20) (3.78) (0.19) (5.06)  (1.15) (1.34) 
  Standard deviation  -0.00006  -0.00008  -0.00008 -0.0069 0.00001 -0.0016  -0.0003 -0.00007 
 (3.37)  (18.25)  (12.00)  (8.08)  (5.74)  (20.51)  (7.80)  (2.93) 
School type fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Circuit fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared  0.7745  0.8081  0.8787 0.6823 0.3666 0.5243  0.2106 0.1187 
Number of observations  309  319  323  309  294  310  310  213 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values, based on Huber robust standard errors with KIDS-2 clusters.  
SGB is school governing body. 
 
 
In Columns 1 to 3, median monthly household income in 1998 has a significant 
and positive effect on the log annual school fees in all years, which is consistent with 
voting and social planner hypotheses.  More interestingly, standard deviation, which 
measures income inequality within a community, has a significant negative effect on 
school fees.  Therefore, the determination of the school fee is sensitive to the low end of 
community income distribution.  This result either supports a noncooperative game in 
which the poor gain bargaining power against the rich to push down the school fee or 
altruistic behavior among community members favors the poor. 
In Columns 4 to 7, we expand definitions of revenue to income categories other 
than school fee.  Column 4 shows the total per-learner revenues, including various fund-
raising, donations, and other income-generating activities, in addition to school fees 
collected from parents.  The previous results continue to be robust here.  The total per-
learner revenue increases as median income increases, while it decreases as standard 
deviation increases.  In Column 5, which shows the proportion of the school fee in the 
total revenue, we find that income inequality increases the dependence of school 
financing on school fees.  Columns 6 and 7 show the determinants of per-learner fund-
raising and donations.  Although school fees are charged to families who send children to 
school, fund-raising and donations are open to outsiders.  Fund-raising and donations 23 
seem to originate mainly from inside communities, that is, festivals and charity affairs are 
organized in the community, and local businesses are asked for donations, and so forth.  
Consistently, an increase in median income raises revenue, while an increase in the 
standard deviation decreases revenue.  In unequal communities, those where income 
inequality is pronounced, it appears that income generation becomes difficult at the 
community level either because collaboration among community members is difficult or 
because donors are limited to a small number of relatively rich people in the community. 
Column 8 shows the probit result on whether or not the school governing body 
holds meetings more than once a month.  Interestingly, income inequality within a 
community reduces the frequency of meetings.  This result suggests that in unequal 
communities, it is difficult for members to cooperate to make collective decisions. 
In Appendix 2, Table 4, we report the determinants of the proportion of fees 
unpaid with and without a log of school fee on the right-hand side.  Nonpayment could be 
due to official exemption or simply postponement of the fee payment.  In Column 1, 
neither median nor standard deviation of community income has a significant effect on 
the exemption rate.  In Column 2, the log of school fee has a significant positive effect on 
the nonpayment proportion.  To further control local heterogeneity, Column 3 includes 
the interaction terms of school type and circuit indicators.  First, it is found that standard 
deviation of community income significantly increases the unpaid proportion.  Since the 
median income is controlled (insignificant), the result implies that those who cannot pay 
are in the lower tail of the income distribution.  Second, an increase in the school fee 
increases the proportion of those who cannot afford to pay.  As discussed, the estimated 
effect on the school fee is likely to be biased downward, so the positive sign indicates 
that the true effect is even larger. 
School Quality and Financial Conditions 
Table 3 summarizes estimation results on school quality determination.  School 
quality is measured by the learner-educator ratio (LER) and the sensitivity of the number 24 
of educators to changes in the number of learners, which we construct from the School 
Register of Needs (SRN) 1996 and 2000.  An increase in LER means a decrease in school 
quality.  As Case and Yogo (1999) show, LER had significant effects on the rate of 
returns to schooling in South Africa during the apartheid regime.  Qualified empirical 
analyses found some significant causal effects on the educational achievement such as 
test scores (for example, Angrist and Lavy 1999; Card and Krueger 1996; Case and 
Deaton 1999; Dustman, Rajah, and Soest 2003; Hoxby 2000; Krueger 1999), though the 
literature in general reaches mixed conclusions (Hanushek 1998).
24  Yamauchi (2005b) 
shows that changes in the number of educators in response to changes in the number of 
learners are larger in formerly non-black (non-African) schools than in formerly black 
schools in post-apartheid South Africa, which indicates that many formerly black schools 
are liquidity constrained. 
In the education function that we estimate, inputs are (log transformed) school 
fees and per-learner funding from the government.  As discussed in previous sections, the 
school fee in 1998 is taken from the Annual School Survey 1999.  School funding 
information comes from the KwaZulu Natal Department of Education. 
Columns 1 to 3 use school fees in different years.  The dependent variables are 
changes in LER from 1996 to 2000.  Former population group, school type, and circuit 
indicators are controlled.  Parameters of interest are those on school fee and per-learner 
funding.  In these columns, the effects of these revenue conditions are significant and 
negative.  Thus, the better the school financial situation, the better the school’s quality.  
In a preliminary analysis, log school fee in 2000 was included, but its effect on the 
dynamic change in LER from 1996 to 2000 was insignificant.  Column 3 uses per-learner 
                                                 
24 The difficulty in identifying the causality arises from potential endogeneity in the number of learners and 
unobserved fixed components specific to school and community, which are likely correlated with school 
inputs.  For example, Lazear (2001) argues that the effect of LER on student achievement could be 
empirically ambiguous because of (often unobserved) heterogeneity in students’ quality, that is discipline.  
In his model, the optimal size of class (that is, LER) increases if students’ discipline improves, since the 
probability of disruption in a classroom decreases.  To avoid such a correlation between LER and 
unobservables, recent studies use exogenous variations (changes) in LER and class size to identify the 
effect on student achievement. 25 
total revenue (excluding government funding), which also has a significant and negative 
effect on the LER.  
Table 3—Learner-educator ratio and government subsidy 
 
Change in learner educator 
ratio 










Dependent variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5)    (6) 
Log school fee 1998  -0.4204      0.6870  0.7249    -0.1061 
 (1.76)      (8.25)  (8.48)    (11.73) 
Log school fee 1999    -0.6994           
   (2.31)          
Log per-learner total revenue 1998      -0.5481         
     (1.91)         
Log per-learner government funding 
(January 01, 2000 – March 31, 2000)  -8.2887 -8.2919 -7.8244  -0.3378 -0.3341     
 (10.22)  (10.35)  (9.52)  (3.92)  (3.68)     
Change in learner size        0.00035  -0.0034     
       (2.19)  (1.00)     
Change in learner size * log fee 1998          0.0013     
         (2.75)     
Change in learner size * log funding 
2000         -0.00048     
         (0.92)     
Learner-educator ratio 1996              0.0021 
             (2.92) 
School type fixed effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes 
Former department fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes    Yes 
Circuit  fixed  effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes    Yes 
R-squared 0.1622  0.1315  0.1588 0.4432  0.4569    0.6085 
Number of observations  3,933 3,947 3,951  4,011 4,011    3,933 
Notes:  The numbers in parentheses are absolute t-values based on Huber standard errors with circuit clusters.  The 
sample has schools with positive numbers of educators and learners in both 1996 and 2000, classrooms in 1996 
recorded in the School Register of Needs and funded or aided from the government. 
 
 
In Columns 4 and 5, we test how school financing can change the number of 
privately employed educators (nonsubsidized educators), controlling changes in learner 
size.  First, an increase in learner size increases the number of those educators.  Second, 
the log of school fee 1998 increases the number of nonsubsidized educators, while the 
government funding decreases the change.  Third, most interestingly, the interaction term 
of the log school fee and the change in the number of learners both show a significant 
positive effect, which implies that with a higher school fee (ability to pay for schooling in 26 
the community), an increase in the number of learners can be accommodated by an 
increase in privately paid educators.  These results are consistent with the prediction that 
communities that are capable of paying for schooling investments will increase the 
quality of education for the next generation with their own resources. 
In the last column, per-learner funding is regressed on the 1998 school fee and 
1996 LER with fixed effects of former population groups, school types, and circuits.  The 
estimate shows that in 2000, the initially less-endowed schools (and also areas) were 
likely to receive more funding from the government. 
6.  Simulations: Inequality Is Harmful to Human Capital Investment 
In this section, we attempt to assess the effects of income inequality on the quality 
of education, measured by the school fee, as a proxy for the community’s ability to pay 
for schooling investments.  For this purpose, the following experiment is conducted, 
given the estimated parameters in the school fee determination equations, derived from 
the Census 2001 information.  Since our purpose is to see the impact of a reduction of 
income inequality, the mean of household income in the community is kept constant.  
Maintaining the mean in each community means that aggregate income is kept constant, 
so that changes arising from the experiments conducted below are redistributional within 
each community. 
Let us summarize the distribution of within-subplace mean (Figure 3) and 
standard deviations of household income (Figure 4).  Both are skewed, with the mean 
being larger than the median.  Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship between the mean 
and standard deviation.  It shows that, on average in the country, the level and inequality 
of household income are positively correlated, so that as average income increases, 
inequality is also likely to increase but with the variations across subplaces increasing as 
well.  Given a certain level of community mean income, we observe quite large 
heterogeneity in the within-community income inequality.  We compare equally endowed 
communities with similar average incomes but with intracommunity distributions being 27 
different, in order to see the change in school fee in response to moving from the very 
unequal (located in the top of the band in Figure 5) to equal distributions (located in the 
bottom of the band). 
Figure 3—Distribution of mean household income, by subplace 
 
 
Figure 4—Distribution of standard deviations of household income, by subplace 
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Figure 5—Mean versus standard deviations of household income, by subplace 
 
We use two different parameter values from Table 1 to quantify the effects of a 
decrease in income standard deviations on school fee.  A set of parameters is taken from 
the column-2 specification with former department, school type, and district fixed effects 
being controlled but not including settlement type distributions.  Another parameter set is 
taken from the column 4 specification, which controls settlement type distributions and 
the proportions of white and black residents, in addition to former department, school 
type, and district fixed effects.  The former provides an aggressive estimate, while the 
latter provides a conservative estimate of the distributional effect on log school fee. 
Figure 6 shows the simulation results.  The sample average of log school fee is 
used as the initial point when intracommunity distribution is perfectly equal.  The 
standard deviations range from zero to 5*10
5 so that it roughly corresponds to the 
horizontal width of the band at the mean income 2*10
5.  The result is converted to the 
school fee in rand.  Although results differ between the two specifications, we may 
conclude that a substantial change in school fee happens when income inequality is 
decreased to zero (keeping the mean).  For instance, the reduction of 4*10
5 rand, 


























corresponding to the mean of nearly 10
5 rand in Figure 3, will bring about a change in the 
school fee from 76 to 109 rand (using the average of the two parameter estimates).  
Remember again that in this experiment, we do not have to change the aggregate income 
level in the country and involve intercommunity income redistributions, but we must 
keep the mean income in each community.  An interesting and very strong implication is 
that we may increase the quality of education by adjusting the intracommunity income 
distribution. 
Figure 6—Gain from within-community inequality reduction:  Mean-preserving experience 
 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine how local income distribution affects a community’s 
capability of improving school quality by increasing the school fee, using evidence from 





















South Africa.  The empirical results show two important paths.  First, both school fees 
and government subsidies determine the learner-educator ratio.  The capability of a 
community to afford a higher school fee thus enhances human capital and income 
opportunities for the next generation.  
Second, we also find that while, at the community level, a higher average 
household income increases the school fee, income inequality decreases the school fee.  
In the context of South Africa, the school governing body, which consists of community 
leaders, educators, and parents, tends to lower the school fee if income distribution is 
unequal.  That is, they listen to the low-income households, who are more likely to face 
liquidity constraints than high-income households.  This empirical regularity is consistent 
with the strategic behavior of low-income groups who do not pay school fees in full and 
the Pareto optimal school fee determination in which some income is transferred to low-
income groups (as discussed in Appendix 1). 
Whether community leaders coordinate interests or community members behave 
strategically, the negative effect of income inequality on school fees has the same long-
term implications for income dynamics.  The lower tail of income distribution pulls down 
school fees, and it also affects the average quality of education for the next generation.  
Therefore, the local income distribution of the parents’ generation (aside from parents’ 
own resources) indirectly influences the income opportunities of the next generation.  
Policy interventions are needed to stop this vicious cycle.  For instance, government 
subsidies must be increased to those schools and communities trapped in situations where 
they cannot collect sufficient school fees, a policy that South Africa has recently 
implemented.  It is also desirable to have reliable macroeconomic and dynamic 
projections on what consequences this subsidy allocation reform will bring to a society 
that historically has suffered enormous inequality and inequity.  To answer these 
questions, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Appendix 1 
First, we examine Pareto optimal allocation with interhousehold income transfers 
τi in a simple framework.
25  Assume that a community leader decides the school fee p to 
maximize the sum of utilities subject to two community-level constraints and one 
household-level constraint:  (1) resource feasibility constraint  , i i Np y ≤∑ ; (2) income 
transfer constraint  0 i iτ ≤ ∑ , where τi is a net transfer that household i receives; and 
(3)  i p τ θ ≤ , where θ ≤ 1, that is, income transfer (payment postponement or exemption) 
is smaller than a certain proportion of the school fee.  The Pareto programming with 
corresponding Lagrange multipliers is 
 
































From the first order conditions, 
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and knowing λ = 0 at the optimum, we obtain 
                                                 

















Note that when θ = 1, the first period consumption will be equalized with complete 
transfers,  ()
** *
ii p y τ − .  When θ < 1, p
** decreases with more binding cases in τi = θp 
(that is, μI > 0).  Here, the lower tail of income distribution is likely to pull down the 
optimal school fee.  Lagrange multipliers (λ,η,{μi} affect p
**.  We summarize key results 
in the following proposition. 
Proposition A1: 
(1) As the average community income increases, p
** increases (as λ decreases). 
(2) If θ < 1, a mean preserving spread of community incomes decreases p




Census 2001 Community Profile Database (Statistics South Africa) 
Annual School Survey 1999 (National Department of Education) 
Annual School Survey 2002 (National Department of Education) 
School Register of Needs 1996 (National Department of Education) 
School Register of Needs 2000 (National Department of Education) 
KwaZulu Natal Income Dynamics Study 1998 (International Food Policy Research 
Institute) 
Norms and Standard Database, KwaZulu Natal Department of Education 1999, 2000 
(KwaZulu Natal Department of Education) 
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Appendix 2 Table 
Table 4—Nonpayment of school fees 
  Proportion of unpaid fee 
Dependent variable 1998  (1) (2) (3) 
Monthly household income 1998       
  Median  0.00001  0.00003  4.87E 
 (0.57)  (1.23)  (0.02) 
  Standard deviation  -2.59E-06  3.77E-06 0.00001 
 (0.64)  (0.49)  (1.99) 
Log school fee 1998    0.0984  0.1069 
   (2.10)  (1.99) 
School type fixed effects  Yes  Yes  yes 
Circuit fixed effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
School type * circuit      Yes 
R-squared  0.2525 0.2779 0.4787 
Number  of  observations  309 309 309 








Alesina, A., and D. Rodrik.  1994.  Distributive politics and economic growth.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 109 (2): 465–490. 
Angrist, J., and V. Lavy.  1999.  Using Maimonides’ rule to estimate the effect of class 
size on scholastic achievement.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (2): 
533-575. 
Bardhan, P. K., and D. Mookherjee.  2000.  Capture and governance at local and national 
levels.  American Economic Review 90 (2): 135-139. 
Benjamin, D., L. Brandt, and J. Giles.  2004.  The dynamics of inequality and growth in 
rural China: Does higher inequality impede growth?  Department of Economics, 
University of Toronto.  Manuscript. 
Bot, M., D. Wilson, and S. Dove.  2000.  Education atlas of South Africa.  Durban:  
EduAction. 
Card, D., and A. Krueger.  1996.  Labor market effects of school quality:  Theory and 
evidence.  NBER Working Paper No.5450.  Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.:  National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Case, A., and A. Deaton.  1999.  School inputs and educational outcomes in South Africa.  
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 1047–1084. 
Case, A., and M. Yogo.  1999.  Does school quality matter?  Returns to education and 
the characteristics of schools in South Africa.  NBER Working Paper No. 7399.  
Cambridge, Mass., U.S.A.:  National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Chattopadhyay, R., and E. Duflo.  2004.  Women as policy makers:  Evidence from an 
India-wide randomized policy experiment in India.  Econometrica 72 (5): 
1409-1443. 
Crouch, L.  1996.  Public education equity and efficiency in South Africa:  Lessons for 
other countries.  Economics of Education Review 15 (2): 125–137. 
Dustman, C., N. Rajah, and V. Soest.  2003.  Class size, education, and wages.  Economic 
Journal 113 (1): F99-F120. 35 
Easterly, W.  2002.  Inequality does cause underdevelopment:  New evidence.  Working 
paper, Center for Global Development, Washington, D.C. 
Foster, A. D., and M. R. Rosenzweig.  2001.  Democratization, decentralization, and the 
distribution of local public goods in a poor rural economy.  Brown University, 
Providence, R.I., USA.  Photocopy. 
Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole.  1993.  Game theory.  Boston:  Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology Press. 
Galor, O., and J. Zeira.  1993.  Income distribution and macroeconomics.  Review of 
Economic Studies 60 (1): 35-52. 
Ghatak, Maitreesh, and Maitreya Ghatak.  2002.  Recent reforms in the Panchayat 
System in West Bengal:  Toward participatory governance.  Economic and 
Political Weekly 37 (1) (January 5). 
Gloom, G.  2004.  Inequality, majority voting and the redistributive effects of public 
education funding.  Pacific Economic Review 9 (2): 93-101. 
Hanushek, E.  1998.  Conclusions and controversies about the effectiveness of school 
resources.  Federal Reserve Board of New York Economic Policy Review 4 (1): 
11–27. 
Hoxby, C.  2000.  The effects of class size on student achievement:  New evidence from 
natural population variation.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 115 (4): 
1239-1286. 
Kaldor, N.  1956.  Alternative theories of distribution.  Review of Economic Studies 23 
(2): 83–100. 
Kriege, D., S. Cairns, B. Makalima, and D. Scott.  1994.  Education atlas of South Africa. 
Durban:  Education Foundation. 
Krueger, A.  1999.  Experimental estimates of education production functions.  Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 114 (2): 497–532. 
Lazear, E. P.  2001.  Educational production.  Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (3): 
777-804. 36 
Lewis, A.  1954.  Economic development with unlimited supplies of labor.  The 
Manchester School 22 (2): 139–191. 
Perotti, R.  1993.  Political equilibrium, income distribution, and growth.  Review of 
Economic Studies 60 (4): 755-776. 
Persson, T., and G. Tabellini.  1994.  Is inequality harmful for growth?  American 
Economic Review 84 (3): 600–621. 
Yamauchi, F.  2004.  Convergence over space and generations.  International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  Photocopy. 
________.  2005a.  Early childhood nutrition, schooling, and within-sibling inequality in 
a dynamic context:  Evidence from South Africa.  International Food Policy 
Research Institute, Washington, D.C.  Photocopy. 
________.  2005b.  Race, equity, and public schools in post-apartheid South Africa.  





 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
200  Is Greater Decisionmaking Power of Women Associated with Reduced Gender Discrimination in South Asia? 
Lisa C. Smith and Elizabeth M. Byron, August 2005 
199  Evaluating the Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer Programs: An Illustration Based on PROGRESA in 
Mexico, David Coady, Raul Perez, and Hadid Vera-Ilamas, July 2005 
198  Why the Poor in Rural Malawi Are Where They Are:  An Analysis of the Spatial Determinants of the Local 
Prevalence of Poverty, Todd Benson, Jordan Chamberlin, and Ingrid Rhinehart, July 2005 
194  Livelihoods, Growth, and Links to Market Towns in 15 Ethiopian Villages, Stefan Dercon and John 
Hoddinott, July 2005 
193  Livelihood Diversification and Rural-Urban Linkages in Vietnam’s Red River Delta, Hoang Xuan Thanh, 
Dang Nguyen Anh, and Ceclila Tacoli, June 2005 
192  Poverty, Inequality, and Geographic Targeting: Evidence from Small-Area Estimates in Mozambique, 
Kenneth R. Simler and Virgulino Nhate, June 2005 
191  Program Participation Under Means-Testing and Self-Selection Targeting Methods, David P. Coady and 
Susan W. Parker, April 2005 
190  Social Learning, Neighborhood Effects, and Investment in Human Capital:  Evidence from Green-Revolution 
India, Futoshi Yamauchi, April 2005 
189  Estimating Utility-Consistent Poverty Lines, Channing Arndt and Kenneth R. Simler, March 2005 
188  Coping with the “Coffee Crisis” in Central America:  The Role of the Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social 
(RPS), John A. Maluccio, February 2005 
187  The Use of Operations Research as a Tool for Monitoring and Managing Food-Assisted Maternal/Child 
Health and Nutrition (MCHN) Programs:  An Example from Haiti, Cornelia Loechl, Marie T. Ruel, Gretel 
Pelto, and Purnima Menon, February 2005 
186  Are Wealth Transfers Biased Against Girls? Gender Differences in Land Inheritance and Schooling 
Investment in Ghana’s Western Region, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Ellen M. Payongayong, and Keijiro Otsuka, 
August 2004 
185  Assets at Marriage in Rural Ethiopia, Marcel Fafchamps and Agnes Quisumbing, August 2004 
184  Impact Evaluation of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program: The Nicaraguan Red de Protección Social, John 
A. Maluccio and Rafael Flores, July 2004 
183  Poverty in Malawi, 1998, Todd Benson, Charles Machinjili, and Lawrence Kachikopa, July 2004 
182  Race, Equity, and Public Schools in Post-Apartheid South Africa:  Is Opportunity Equal for All Kids?  
Futoshi Yamauchi, June 2004 
181  Scaling Up Community-Driven Development:  A Synthesis of Experience, Stuart Gillespie, June 2004 
180  Kudumbashree—Collective Action for Poverty Alleviation and Women’s Employment, Suneetha Kadiyala, 
May 2004 
179  Scaling Up HIV/AIDS Interventions Through Expanded Partnerships (STEPs) in Malawi, Suneetha Kadiyala, 
May 2004 
178  Community-Driven Development and Scaling Up of Microfinance Services:  Case Studies from Nepal and 
India, Manohar P. Sharma, April 2004 
177  Community Empowerment and Scaling Up in Urban Areas:  The Evolution of PUSH/PROSPECT in Zambia, 
James Garrett, April 2004 
176  Why Is Child Malnutrition Lower in Urban than Rural Areas?  Evidence from 36 Developing Countries, Lisa 
C. Smith, Marie T. Ruel, and Aida Ndiaye, March 2004 
175  Consumption Smoothing and Vulnerability in the Zone Lacustre, Mali, Sarah Harrower and John Hoddinott, 
March 2004 
174  The Cost of Poverty Alleviation Transfer Programs:  A Comparative Analysis of Three Programs in Latin 
America, Natàlia Caldés, David Coady, and John A. Maluccio, February 2004 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
173  Food Aid Distribution in Bangladesh: Leakage and Operational Performance, Akhter U. Ahmed, Shahidur 
Rashid, Manohar Sharma, and Sajjad Zohir in collaboration with Mohammed Khaliquzzaman, Sayedur 
Rahman, and the Data Analysis and Technical Assistance Limited, February 2004 
172  Designing and Evaluating Social Safety Nets:  Theory, Evidence, and Policy Conclusions, David P. Coady, 
January 2004 
171  Living Life:  Overlooked Aspects of Urban Employment, James Garrett, January 2004 
170  From Research to Program Design:  Use of Formative Research in Haiti to Develop a Behavior Change 
Communication Program to Prevent Malnutrition, Purnima Menon, Marie T. Ruel, Cornelia Loechl, and 
Gretel Pelto, December 2003 
169  Nonmarket Networks Among Migrants:  Evidence from Metropolitan Bangkok, Thailand, Futoshi Yamauchi 
and Sakiko Tanabe, December 2003 
168  Long-Term Consequences of Early Childhood Malnutrition, Harold Alderman, John Hoddinott, and Bill 
Kinsey, December 2003 
167  Public Spending and Poverty in Mozambique, Rasmus Heltberg, Kenneth Simler, and Finn Tarp, December 
2003 
166  Are Experience and Schooling Complementary? Evidence from Migrants’ Assimilation in the Bangkok Labor 
Market, Futoshi Yamauchi, December 2003 
165  What Can Food Policy Do to Redirect the Diet Transition?  Lawrence Haddad, December 2003 
164  Impacts of Agricultural Research on Poverty:  Findings of an Integrated Economic and Social Analysis, Ruth 
Meinzen-Dick, Michelle Adato, Lawrence Haddad, and Peter Hazell, October 2003 
163  An Integrated Economic and Social Analysis to Assess the Impact of Vegetable and Fishpond Technologies 
on Poverty in Rural Bangladesh, Kelly Hallman, David Lewis, and Suraiya Begum, October 2003 
162  The Impact of Improved Maize Germplasm on Poverty Alleviation:  The Case of Tuxpeño-Derived Material 
in Mexico, Mauricio R. Bellon, Michelle Adato, Javier Becerril, and Dubravka Mindek, October 2003 
161  Assessing the Impact of High-Yielding Varieties of Maize in Resettlement Areas of Zimbabwe, Michael 
Bourdillon, Paul Hebinck, John Hoddinott, Bill Kinsey, John Marondo, Netsayi Mudege, and Trudy Owens, 
October 2003 
160  The Impact of Agroforestry-Based Soil Fertility Replenishment Practices on the Poor in Western Kenya, 
Frank Place, Michelle Adato, Paul Hebinck, and Mary Omosa, October 2003 
159  Rethinking Food Aid to Fight HIV/AIDS, Suneetha Kadiyala and Stuart Gillespie, October 2003 
158  Food Aid and Child Nutrition in Rural Ethiopia, Agnes R. Quisumbing, September 2003 
157  HIV/AIDS, Food Security, and Rural Livelihoods:  Understanding and Responding, Michael Loevinsohn and 
Stuart Gillespie, September 2003 
156  Public Policy, Food Markets, and Household Coping Strategies in Bangladesh:  Lessons from the 1998 
Floods, Carlo del Ninno, Paul A. Dorosh, and Lisa C. Smith, September 2003 
155  Consumption Insurance and Vulnerability to Poverty:  A Synthesis of the Evidence from Bangladesh, 
Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico, and Russia, Emmanuel Skoufias and Agnes R. Quisumbing, August 2003 
154  Cultivating Nutrition:  A Survey of Viewpoints on Integrating Agriculture and Nutrition, Carol E. Levin, 
Jennifer Long, Kenneth R. Simler, and Charlotte Johnson-Welch, July 2003 
153  Maquiladoras and Market Mamas:  Women’s Work and Childcare in Guatemala City and Accra, Agnes R. 
Quisumbing, Kelly Hallman, and Marie T. Ruel, June 2003 
152  Income Diversification in Zimbabwe:  Welfare Implications From Urban and Rural Areas, Lire Ersado, 
June 2003 
151  Childcare and Work:  Joint Decisions Among Women in Poor Neighborhoods of Guatemala City, Kelly 
Hallman, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Marie T. Ruel, and Bénédicte de la Brière, June 2003 
150  The Impact of PROGRESA on Food Consumption, John Hoddinott and Emmanuel Skoufias, May 2003 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
149  Do Crowded Classrooms Crowd Out Learning?  Evidence From the Food for Education Program in 
Bangladesh, Akhter U. Ahmed and Mary Arends-Kuenning, May 2003 
148  Stunted Child-Overweight Mother Pairs:  An Emerging Policy Concern? James L. Garrett and Marie T. Ruel, 
April 2003 
147  Are Neighbors Equal?  Estimating Local Inequality in Three Developing Countries, Chris Elbers, Peter 
Lanjouw, Johan Mistiaen, Berk Özler, and Kenneth Simler, April 2003 
146  Moving Forward with Complementary Feeding:  Indicators and Research Priorities, Marie T. Ruel, Kenneth 
H. Brown, and Laura E. Caulfield, April 2003 
145  Child Labor and School Decisions in Urban and Rural Areas:  Cross Country Evidence, Lire Ersado, 
December 2002 
144  Targeting Outcomes Redux, David Coady, Margaret Grosh, and John Hoddinott, December 2002 
143  Progress in Developing an Infant and Child Feeding Index: An Example Using the Ethiopia Demographic 
and Health Survey 2000, Mary Arimond and Marie T. Ruel, December 2002 
142  Social Capital and Coping With Economic Shocks: An Analysis of Stunting of South African Children, 
Michael R. Carter and John A. Maluccio, December 2002 
141  The Sensitivity of Calorie-Income Demand Elasticity to Price Changes: Evidence from Indonesia, Emmanuel 
Skoufias, November 2002 
140  Is Dietary Diversity an Indicator of Food Security or Dietary Quality? A Review of Measurement Issues and 
Research Needs, Marie T. Ruel, November 2002 
139  Can South Africa Afford to Become Africa’s First Welfare State? James Thurlow, October 2002 
138  The Food for Education Program in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of its Impact on Educational Attainment and 
Food Security, Akhter U. Ahmed and Carlo del Ninno, September 2002 
137  Reducing Child Undernutrition: How Far Does Income Growth Take Us? Lawrence Haddad, Harold 
Alderman, Simon Appleton, Lina Song, and Yisehac Yohannes, August 2002 
136  Dietary Diversity as a Food Security Indicator, John Hoddinott and Yisehac Yohannes, June 2002 
135  Trust, Membership in Groups, and Household Welfare: Evidence from KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa, 
Lawrence Haddad and John A. Maluccio, May 2002 
134  In-Kind Transfers and Household Food Consumption: Implications for Targeted Food Programs in 
Bangladesh, Carlo del Ninno and Paul A. Dorosh, May 2002 
133  Avoiding Chronic and Transitory Poverty: Evidence From Egypt, 1997-99, Lawrence Haddad and Akhter U. 
Ahmed, May 2002 
132  Weighing What’s Practical: Proxy Means Tests for Targeting Food Subsidies in Egypt, Akhter U. Ahmed and 
Howarth E. Bouis, May 2002 
131  Does Subsidized Childcare Help Poor Working Women in Urban Areas? Evaluation of a Government-
Sponsored Program in Guatemala City, Marie T. Ruel, Bénédicte de la Brière, Kelly Hallman, Agnes 
Quisumbing, and Nora Coj, April 2002 
130  Creating a Child Feeding Index Using the Demographic and Health Surveys: An Example from Latin 
America, Marie T. Ruel and Purnima Menon, April 2002 
129  Labor Market Shocks and Their Impacts on Work and Schooling: Evidence from Urban Mexico, Emmanuel 
Skoufias and Susan W. Parker, March 2002 
128  Assessing the Impact of Agricultural Research on Poverty Using the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, 
Michelle Adato and Ruth Meinzen-Dick, March 2002 
127  A Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Demand- and Supply-Side Education Interventions: The Case of 
PROGRESA in Mexico, David P. Coady and Susan W. Parker, March 2002 
126  Health Care Demand in Rural Mozambique: Evidence from the 1996/97 Household Survey, Magnus 
Lindelow, February 2002 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
125  Are the Welfare Losses from Imperfect Targeting Important?, Emmanuel Skoufias and David Coady, January 
2002 
124  The Robustness of Poverty Profiles Reconsidered, Finn Tarp, Kenneth Simler, Cristina Matusse, Rasmus 
Heltberg, and Gabriel Dava, January 2002 
123  Conditional Cash Transfers and Their Impact on Child Work and Schooling: Evidence from the PROGRESA 
Program in Mexico, Emmanuel Skoufias and Susan W. Parker, October 2001 
122  Strengthening Public Safety Nets: Can the Informal Sector Show the Way?, Jonathan Morduch and Manohar 
Sharma, September 2001 
121  Targeting Poverty Through Community-Based Public Works Programs: A Cross-Disciplinary Assessment of 
Recent Experience in South Africa, Michelle Adato and Lawrence Haddad, August 2001 
120  Control and Ownership of Assets Within Rural Ethiopian Households, Marcel Fafchamps and Agnes R. 
Quisumbing, August 2001 
119  Assessing Care: Progress Towards the Measurement of Selected Childcare and Feeding Practices, and 
Implications for Programs, Mary Arimond and Marie T. Ruel, August 2001 
118 Is  PROGRESA Working? Summary of the Results of an Evaluation by IFPRI, Emmanuel Skoufias and 
Bonnie McClafferty, July 2001 
117  Evaluation of the Distributional Power of PROGRESA’s Cash Transfers in Mexico, David P. Coady, July 
2001 
116  A Multiple-Method Approach to Studying Childcare in an Urban Environment: The Case of Accra, Ghana, 
Marie T. Ruel, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, and Mary Arimond, June 2001 
115  Are Women Overrepresented Among the Poor? An Analysis of Poverty in Ten Developing Countries, Agnes 
R. Quisumbing, Lawrence Haddad, and Christina Peña, June 2001 
114  Distribution, Growth, and Performance of Microfinance Institutions in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, 
Cécile Lapenu and Manfred Zeller, June 2001 
113  Measuring Power, Elizabeth Frankenberg and Duncan Thomas, June 2001 
112  Effective Food and Nutrition Policy Responses to HIV/AIDS: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 
Lawrence Haddad and Stuart Gillespie, June 2001 
111  An Operational Tool for Evaluating Poverty Outreach of Development Policies and Projects, Manfred Zeller, 
Manohar Sharma, Carla Henry, and Cécile Lapenu, June 2001 
110  Evaluating Transfer Programs Within a General Equilibrium Framework, Dave Coady and Rebecca Lee 
Harris, June 2001 
109  Does Cash Crop Adoption Detract From Childcare Provision? Evidence From Rural Nepal, Michael J. 
Paolisso, Kelly Hallman, Lawrence Haddad, and Shibesh Regmi, April 2001 
108  How Efficiently Do Employment Programs Transfer Benefits to the Poor? Evidence from South Africa, 
Lawrence Haddad and Michelle Adato, April 2001 
107  Rapid Assessments in Urban Areas: Lessons from Bangladesh and Tanzania, James L. Garrett and Jeanne 
Downen, April 2001 
106  Strengthening Capacity to Improve Nutrition, Stuart Gillespie, March 2001 
105  The Nutritional Transition and Diet-Related Chronic Diseases in Asia: Implications for Prevention, Barry M. 
Popkin, Sue Horton, and Soowon Kim, March 2001 
104  An Evaluation of the Impact of PROGRESA on Preschool Child Height, Jere R. Behrman and John 
Hoddinott, March 2001 
103  Targeting the Poor in Mexico: An Evaluation of the Selection of Households for PROGRESA, Emmanuel 
Skoufias, Benjamin Davis, and Sergio de la Vega, March 2001 
102  School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating a Mexican Strategy for Reducing Poverty, T. Paul Schultz, March 
2001 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
101 Poverty,  Inequality,  and Spillover in Mexico’s Education, Health, and Nutrition Program, Sudhanshu Handa, 
Mari-Carmen Huerta, Raul Perez, and Beatriz Straffon, March 2001 
100  On the Targeting and Redistributive Efficiencies of Alternative Transfer Instruments, David Coady and 
Emmanuel Skoufias, March 2001 
99  Cash Transfer Programs with Income Multipliers: PROCAMPO in Mexico, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Alain de 
Janvry, and Benjamin Davis, January 2001 
98  Participation and Poverty Reduction: Issues, Theory, and New Evidence from South Africa, John Hoddinott, 
Michelle Adato, Tim Besley, and Lawrence Haddad, January 2001 
97  Socioeconomic Differentials in Child Stunting Are Consistently Larger in Urban Than in Rural Areas, 
Purnima Menon, Marie T. Ruel, and Saul S. Morris, December 2000 
96  Attrition in Longitudinal Household Survey Data: Some Tests for Three Developing-Country Samples, Harold 
Alderman, Jere R. Behrman, Hans-Peter Kohler, John A. Maluccio, Susan Cotts Watkins, October 2000 
95  Attrition in the Kwazulu Natal Income Dynamics Study 1993-1998, John Maluccio, October 2000 
94  Targeting Urban Malnutrition: A Multicity Analysis of the Spatial Distribution of Childhood Nutritional 
Status, Saul Sutkover Morris, September 2000 
93  Mother-Father Resource Control, Marriage Payments, and Girl-Boy Health in Rural Bangladesh, Kelly K. 
Hallman, September 2000 
92  Assessing the Potential for Food-Based Strategies to Reduce Vitamin A and Iron Deficiencies: A Review of 
Recent Evidence, Marie T. Ruel and Carol E. Levin, July 2000 
91  Comparing Village Characteristics Derived From Rapid Appraisals and Household Surveys: A Tale From 
Northern Mali, Luc Christiaensen, John Hoddinott, and Gilles Bergeron, July 2000 
90  Empirical Measurements of Households’ Access to Credit and Credit Constraints in Developing Countries: 
Methodological Issues and Evidence, Aliou Diagne, Manfred Zeller, and Manohar Sharma, July 2000 
89  The Role of the State in Promoting Microfinance Institutions, Cécile Lapenu, June 2000 
88  The Determinants of Employment Status in Egypt, Ragui Assaad, Fatma El-Hamidi, and Akhter U. Ahmed, 
June 2000 
87  Changes in Intrahousehold Labor Allocation to Environmental Goods Collection: A Case Study from Rural 
Nepal, Priscilla A. Cooke, May 2000 
86  Women’s Assets and Intrahousehold Allocation in Rural Bangladesh: Testing Measures of Bargaining 
Power, Agnes R. Quisumbing and Bénédicte de la Brière, April 2000 
85  Intrahousehold Impact of Transfer of Modern Agricultural Technology: A Gender Perspective, Ruchira 
Tabassum Naved, April 2000 
84  Intrahousehold Allocation and Gender Relations: New Empirical Evidence from Four Developing Countries, 
Agnes R. Quisumbing and John A. Maluccio, April 2000 
83  Quality or Quantity? The Supply-Side Determinants of Primary Schooling in Rural Mozambique, Sudhanshu 
Handa and Kenneth R. Simler, March 2000 
82  Pathways of Rural Development in Madagascar: An Empirical Investigation of the Critical Triangle of 
Environmental Sustainability, Economic Growth, and Poverty Alleviation, Manfred Zeller, Cécile Lapenu, 
Bart Minten, Eliane Ralison, Désiré Randrianaivo, and Claude Randrianarisoa, March 2000 
81  The Constraints to Good Child Care Practices in Accra: Implications for Programs, Margaret Armar-
Klemesu, Marie T. Ruel, Daniel G. Maxwell, Carol E. Levin, and Saul S. Morris, February 2000 
80  Nontraditional Crops and Land Accumulation Among Guatemalan Smallholders: Is the Impact Sustainable? 
Calogero Carletto, February 2000 
79  Adult Health in the Time of Drought, John Hoddinott and Bill Kinsey, January 2000 
78  Determinants of Poverty in Mozambique: 1996-97, Gaurav Datt, Kenneth Simler, Sanjukta Mukherjee, and 
Gabriel Dava, January 2000 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
77  The Political Economy of Food Subsidy Reform in Egypt, Tammi Gutner, November 1999. 
76  Raising Primary School Enrolment in Developing Countries: The Relative Importance of Supply and 
Demand, Sudhanshu Handa, November 1999 
75  Determinants of Poverty in Egypt, 1997, Gaurav Datt and Dean Jolliffe, October 1999 
74  Can Cash Transfer Programs Work in Resource-Poor Countries? The Experience in Mozambique, Jan W. 
Low, James L. Garrett, and Vitória Ginja, October 1999 
73  Social Roles, Human Capital, and the Intrahousehold Division of Labor: Evidence from Pakistan, Marcel 
Fafchamps and Agnes R. Quisumbing, October 1999 
72  Validity of Rapid Estimates of Household Wealth and Income for Health Surveys in Rural Africa, Saul S. 
Morris, Calogero Carletto, John Hoddinott, and Luc J. M. Christiaensen, October 1999 
71  Social Capital and Income Generation in South Africa, 1993-98, John Maluccio, Lawrence Haddad, and 
Julian May, September 1999 
70  Child Health Care Demand in a Developing Country: Unconditional Estimates from the Philippines, Kelly 
Hallman, August 1999 
69  Supply Response of West African Agricultural Households: Implications of Intrahousehold Preference 
Heterogeneity, Lisa C. Smith and Jean-Paul Chavas, July 1999 
68  Early Childhood Nutrition and Academic Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis, Paul Glewwe, Hanan 
Jacoby, and Elizabeth King, May 1999 
67  Determinants of Household Access to and Participation in Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Malawi, 
Aliou Diagne, April 1999 
66  Working Women in an Urban Setting: Traders, Vendors, and Food Security in Accra, Carol E. Levin, Daniel 
G. Maxwell, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Marie T. Ruel, Saul S. Morris, and Clement Ahiadeke, April 1999 
65  Are Determinants of Rural and Urban Food Security and Nutritional Status Different? Some Insights from 
Mozambique, James L. Garrett and Marie T. Ruel, April 1999 
64  Some Urban Facts of Life: Implications for Research and Policy, Marie T. Ruel, Lawrence Haddad, and 
James L. Garrett, April 1999 
63  Are Urban Poverty and Undernutrition Growing? Some Newly Assembled Evidence, Lawrence Haddad, 
Marie T. Ruel, and James L. Garrett, April 1999 
62  Good Care Practices Can Mitigate the Negative Effects of Poverty and Low Maternal Schooling on 
Children's Nutritional Status: Evidence from Accra, Marie T. Ruel, Carol E. Levin, Margaret Armar-
Klemesu, Daniel Maxwell, and Saul S. Morris, April 1999 
61  Does Geographic Targeting of Nutrition Interventions Make Sense in Cities? Evidence from Abidjan and 
Accra, Saul S. Morris, Carol Levin, Margaret Armar-Klemesu, Daniel Maxwell, and Marie T. Ruel, April 
1999 
60  Explaining Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: A Cross-Country Analysis, Lisa C. Smith and 
Lawrence Haddad, April 1999 
59  Placement and Outreach of Group-Based Credit Organizations: The Cases of ASA, BRAC, and PROSHIKA 
in Bangladesh, Manohar Sharma and Manfred Zeller, March 1999 
58  Women's Land Rights in the Transition to Individualized Ownership: Implications for the Management of 
Tree Resources in Western Ghana, Agnes Quisumbing, Ellen Payongayong, J. B. Aidoo, and Keijiro Otsuka, 
February 1999 
57  The Structure of Wages During the Economic Transition in Romania, Emmanuel Skoufias, February 1999 
56  How Does the Human Rights Perspective Help to Shape the Food and Nutrition Policy Research Agenda?, 
Lawrence Haddad and Arne Oshaug, February 1999 
55  Efficiency in Intrahousehold Resource Allocation, Marcel Fafchamps, December 1998 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
54  Endogeneity of Schooling in the Wage Function: Evidence from the Rural Philippines, John Maluccio, 
November 1998 
53  Agricultural Wages and Food Prices in Egypt: A Governorate-Level Analysis for 1976-1993, Gaurav Datt 
and Jennifer Olmsted, November 1998 
52  Testing Nash Bargaining Household Models With Time-Series Data, John Hoddinott and Christopher Adam, 
November 1998 
51  Urban Challenges to Food and Nutrition Security: A Review of Food Security, Health, and Caregiving in the 
Cities, Marie T. Ruel, James L. Garrett, Saul S. Morris, Daniel Maxwell, Arne Oshaug, Patrice Engle, 
Purnima Menon, Alison Slack, and Lawrence Haddad, October 1998 
50  Computational Tools for Poverty Measurement and Analysis, Gaurav Datt, October 1998 
49  A Profile of Poverty in Egypt: 1997, Gaurav Datt, Dean Jolliffe, and Manohar Sharma, August 1998. 
48  Human Capital, Productivity, and Labor Allocation in Rural Pakistan, Marcel Fafchamps and Agnes R. 
Quisumbing, July 1998 
47  Poverty in India and Indian States: An Update, Gaurav Datt, July 1998 
46  Impact of Access to Credit on Income and Food Security in Malawi, Aliou Diagne, July 1998 
45  Does Urban Agriculture Help Prevent Malnutrition? Evidence from Kampala, Daniel Maxwell, Carol Levin, 
and Joanne Csete, June 1998 
44  Can FAO's Measure of Chronic Undernourishment Be Strengthened?, Lisa C. Smith, with a Response by 
Logan Naiken, May 1998 
43  How Reliable Are Group Informant Ratings? A Test of Food Security Rating in Honduras, Gilles Bergeron, 
Saul Sutkover Morris, and Juan Manuel Medina Banegas, April 1998 
42  Farm Productivity and Rural Poverty in India, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, March 1998 
41  The Political Economy of Urban Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa, Dan Maxwell, February 1998 
40  Can Qualitative and Quantitative Methods Serve Complementary Purposes for Policy Research? Evidence 
from Accra, Dan Maxwell, January 1998 
39  Whose Education Matters in the Determination of Household Income: Evidence from a Developing Country, 
Dean Jolliffe, November 1997 
38  Systematic Client Consultation in Development: The Case of Food Policy Research in Ghana, India, Kenya, 
and Mali, Suresh Chandra Babu, Lynn R. Brown, and Bonnie McClafferty, November 1997 
37  Why Do Migrants Remit? An Analysis for the Dominican Sierra, Bénédicte de la Brière, Alain de Janvry, 
Sylvie Lambert, and Elisabeth Sadoulet, October 1997 
36  The GAPVU Cash Transfer Program in Mozambique: An assessment, Gaurav Datt, Ellen Payongayong, 
James L. Garrett, and Marie Ruel, October 1997 
35  Market Access by Smallholder Farmers in Malawi: Implications for Technology Adoption, Agricultural 
Productivity, and Crop Income, Manfred Zeller, Aliou Diagne, and Charles Mataya, September 1997 
34  The Impact of Changes in Common Property Resource Management on Intrahousehold Allocation, Philip 
Maggs and John Hoddinott, September 1997 
33  Human Milk—An Invisible Food Resource, Anne Hatløy and Arne Oshaug, August 1997 
32  The Determinants of Demand for Micronutrients: An Analysis of Rural Households in Bangladesh, Howarth 
E. Bouis and Mary Jane G. Novenario-Reese, August 1997 
31  Is There an Intrahousehold 'Flypaper Effect'? Evidence from a School Feeding Program, Hanan Jacoby, 
August 1997 
30  Plant Breeding: A Long-Term Strategy for the Control of Zinc Deficiency in Vulnerable Populations, Marie 
T. Ruel and Howarth E. Bouis, July 1997 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
29  Gender, Property Rights, and Natural Resources, Ruth Meinzen-Dick, Lynn R. Brown, Hilary Sims 
Feldstein, and Agnes R. Quisumbing, May 1997 
28  Developing a Research and Action Agenda for Examining Urbanization and Caregiving: Examples from 
Southern and Eastern Africa, Patrice L. Engle, Purnima Menon, James L. Garrett, and Alison Slack, April 
1997 
27  "Bargaining" and Gender Relations: Within and Beyond the Household, Bina Agarwal, March 1997 
26  Why Have Some Indian States Performed Better Than Others at Reducing Rural Poverty?, Gaurav Datt and 
Martin Ravallion, March 1997 
25  Water, Health, and Income: A Review, John Hoddinott, February 1997 
24  Child Care Practices Associated with Positive and Negative Nutritional Outcomes for Children in 
Bangladesh: A Descriptive Analysis, Shubh K. Kumar Range, Ruchira Naved, and Saroj Bhattarai, February 
1997 
23  Better Rich, or Better There? Grandparent Wealth, Coresidence, and Intrahousehold Allocation, Agnes R. 
Quisumbing, January 1997 
22  Alternative Approaches to Locating the Food Insecure: Qualitative and Quantitative Evidence from South 
India, Kimberly Chung, Lawrence Haddad, Jayashree Ramakrishna, and Frank Riely, January 1997 
21  Livestock Income, Male/Female Animals, and Inequality in Rural Pakistan, Richard H. Adams, Jr., 
November 1996 
20  Macroeconomic Crises and Poverty Monitoring: A Case Study for India, Gaurav Datt and Martin Ravallion, 
November 1996 
19  Food Security and Nutrition Implications of Intrahousehold Bias: A Review of Literature, Lawrence Haddad, 
Christine Peña, Chizuru Nishida, Agnes Quisumbing, and Alison Slack, September 1996 
18  Care and Nutrition: Concepts and Measurement, Patrice L. Engle, Purnima Menon, and Lawrence Haddad, 
August 1996 
17  Remittances, Income Distribution, and Rural Asset Accumulation, Richard H. Adams, Jr., August 1996 
16  How Can Safety Nets Do More with Less? General Issues with Some Evidence from Southern Africa, 
Lawrence Haddad and Manfred Zeller, July 1996 
15  Repayment Performance in Group-Based credit Programs in Bangladesh: An Empirical Analysis, Manohar 
Sharma and Manfred Zeller, July 1996 
14  Demand for High-Value Secondary Crops in Developing Countries: The Case of Potatoes in Bangladesh and 
Pakistan, Howarth E. Bouis and Gregory Scott, May 1996 
13  Determinants of Repayment Performance in Credit Groups: The Role of Program Design, Intra-Group Risk 
Pooling, and Social Cohesion in Madagascar, Manfred Zeller, May 1996 
12  Child Development: Vulnerability and Resilience, Patrice L. Engle, Sarah Castle, and Purnima Menon, April 
1996 
11  Rural Financial Policies for Food Security of the Poor: Methodologies for a Multicountry Research Project, 
Manfred Zeller, Akhter Ahmed, Suresh Babu, Sumiter Broca, Aliou Diagne, and Manohar Sharma, April 
1996 
10  Women's Economic Advancement Through Agricultural Change: A Review of Donor Experience, Christine 
Peña, Patrick Webb, and Lawrence Haddad, February 1996 
09  Gender and Poverty: New Evidence from 10 Developing Countries, Agnes R. Quisumbing, Lawrence 
Haddad, and Christine Peña, December 1995 
08  Measuring Food Insecurity: The Frequency and Severity of "Coping Strategies," Daniel G. Maxwell, 
December 1995 
07  A Food Demand System Based on Demand for Characteristics: If There Is "Curvature" in the Slutsky Matrix, 
What Do the Curves Look Like and Why?, Howarth E. Bouis, December 1995 FCND DISCUSSION PAPERS 
 
 
06  Gender Differentials in Farm Productivity: Implications for Household Efficiency and Agricultural Policy, 
Harold Alderman, John Hoddinott, Lawrence Haddad, and Christopher Udry, August 1995 
05  Gender Differences in Agricultural Productivity: A Survey of Empirical Evidence, Agnes R. Quisumbing, 
July 1995 
04  Market Development and Food Demand in Rural China, Jikun Huang and Scott Rozelle, June 1995 
03  The Extended Family and Intrahousehold Allocation: Inheritance and Investments in Children in the Rural 
Philippines, Agnes R. Quisumbing, March 1995 
02  Determinants of Credit Rationing: A Study of Informal Lenders and Formal Credit Groups in Madagascar, 
Manfred Zeller, October 1994 
01  Agricultural Technology and Food Policy to Combat Iron Deficiency in Developing Countries, Howarth E. 
Bouis, August 1994  
 
 